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ABSTRACT 
Prior research studies have demonstrated a practical methodology for quantifying 
the return on investment (ROI) of Navy Cryptologic Carry-on Program (CCOP) signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) collection systems and a practical pathway for implementing a 
performance accounting system that generates these estimates. This research is a 
continuation of previous work on the requirements and design of an accounting software 
to provide return on investment (ROI) estimates for CCOP SIGINT collection systems.  
We follow the Unified Process, an iterative, incremental software development process 
and apply use case analysis to obtain requirements of the accounting software.  We then 
develop a high-level architecture design for a software meeting the requirements, and 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This research will address the specific problems associated with implementing 
performance accounting software within classified military networks used for intelligence 
collection.  The software will provide near-real-time routine return on investment (ROI) 
analysis that will aid decision-makers in the budgeting process for the Navy’s 
Cryptologic Carry-On Program (CCOP) Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) systems.  
Numerous software solutions fail because of poor development and implementation 
practices. This research will focus on determining the best way to successfully implement 
a software program within a military organization. This thesis provides a software design 
and implementation plan that can be used to process near-real-time performance data and 
provide ROI analysis of Navy CCOP systems.  It also provides general guidance on 
avoiding software implementation problems.  Figure 1 provides a visual representation of 
our problem space in the form of a Venn diagram.  
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B. BACKGROUND 
Dr. Tom Housel (Naval Postgraduate School) and Dr. Valery Kanevsky (Agilent 
Labs) created the Knowledge-value Added (KVA) approach.  It is based on the 
assumption that humans and technology increase value to organizations by taking inputs 
and changing them into outputs through core processes (Housel & Bell, 2001, pp. 92–93).  
The KVA approach evaluates and assigns a value to the knowledge embedded within the 
core processes.   
The KVA method was studied and specifically applied to Navy CCOP systems in 
three previous thesis studies. The first thesis, written by LCDR Rios and titled Return on 
Investment Analysis of Information Warfare Systems, developed a method for applying 
KVA analysis with ROI estimates to Navy CCOP systems.  The second thesis project, 
Using Knowledge Value Added (KVA) for Evaluating Cryptologic IT Capabilities: Trial 
Implementation, written by LT Lambeth and LT Clapp, applied Rios’s method to a real-
world data set from Navy CCOP system operations during an 18-month deployment 
onboard a naval vessel. The third thesis project, Collecting Retrieving and Analyzing 
Knowledge Value Added (KVA) Data from U.S. Navy Vessels AFLOAT, by LT Homer, 
developed and evaluated the feasibility of three data-collection processes to be used in 
obtaining real-world CCOP KVA data from any United States Navy ship carrying CCOP 
systems. 
During the course of his study, Rios determined that GaussSoft KVA, a 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) performance accounting software, was the only 
existing software that provided the necessary functionality.  Rios stated, “Although 
several accounting software packages have included KVA analytical capabilities, the 
NPS research team has identified GaussSoft KVA software as the most comprehensive 
software platform for conducting the level of analysis required by DoD program 
managers” (2005, p. 15).  Lambeth and Clapp and Homer continued to use GaussSoft for 
KVA analysis in their follow-on research.  Therefore, we will maintain the assumption 
that GaussSoft performance accounting software is the only one suited to provide routine 
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classified networks.  Our software is designed to run on classified networks and captures 
only the functionality of GaussSoft KVA required for near-real-time ROI analysis of 
Navy CCOP systems. 
The previous studies provided ROI analysis for Navy CCOP systems using the 
KVA methodology.  As a result of these studies, the researchers developed a practical 
methodology for quantifying the ROI of Navy CCOP systems using the KVA framework 
and a pathway for implementing the performance accounting system that generates these 
estimates.  Homer (2009), however, uncovered a new data stream that would allow a 
near-real-time performance analysis of CCOP systems.  We utilized the knowledge 
gained from the previous theses to develop software that incorporates the newly 
discovered near-real-time stream of performance data necessary for KVA analysis. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary research question of this project is the following: Can performance 
accounting software that provides near-real-time ROI analysis be successfully 
implemented for evaluation of Navy CCOP systems?  While addressing the primary 
research question, we addressed several follow-on questions, such as:   
 What are some common issues that result in software project failures? 
 What are effective methods for avoiding these common issues? 
 How can these methods be applied to the development of a software 
solution for ROI analysis of Navy CCOP systems? 
 Can performance accounting software that provides ROI reporting be 
applied to other US Navy CCOP systems?   
 Are previously established assumptions and procedures for KVA analysis 
of CCOP systems also valid for the automated reporting database used to 
report on CCOP ROI performance?   
 What is the relative usefulness of automated CCOP reporting data 
compared to the value of the human-in-the-loop reports that were 
evaluated in previous CCOPs thesis research?    
D. OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this research project is to develop and implement a performance 
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performance of Navy SIGINT collection systems.  Previous research applying the KVA 
methodology to CCOP information technology (IT) has proven that the methodology 
provides valid ROI analysis of the Navy’s CCOP  systems and processes.  Furthermore, 
prior work has attempted to create a plan for deploying software to collect, process, and 
analyze real-world CCOP performance data to provide routine ROI estimates.  Previous 
researchers were unable to implement software to conduct KVA analysis of CCOP 
performance data because the data was located in different networks, databases, and 
formats.  We used case studies of previous software development failures to create a 
software development plan that sought to avoid common mistakes associated with IT 
implementation failures.  We designed and implemented a software solution for 
conducting near-real-time KVA analysis on the newly discovered data set of CCOP 
performance data. The goal of this research was to conduct a trial implementation of a 
performance accounting software that would support collection and ROI data for the 
performance of Navy SIGINT collection systems.  
E. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This research project will directly support the Navy’s Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance (ISR) program with defendable Measures of Performance (MOPs) 
and ROI analysis.  ISR is utilized by the military to collect, process, and analyze 
information within a battlespace and then disseminate that information to the warfighter 
or to national agencies conducting operations in that battlespace.  ISR encompasses many 
areas such as optical photography, infrared emissions, interception of visual and voice 
electromagnetic signals, and interception of radar signals.  IT systems are widely used in 
the ISR field because of their ability to automate the collection, processing, and analysis 
of large quantities of information in a short period of time.   
The 2003 Naval Transformation Roadmap (NTR) provides strategic direction for 
Navy ISR programs and is based on the Joint Forces Command (JFC) transformation 
roadmap as well as on other joint initiatives.  The NTR emphasizes that Navy ISR 
programs of the future will focus on becoming integrated within a joint ISR construct 
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system integration also results in joint ISR competition for funding.  In 2007, the United 
States Government Accountability Office (GAO), in a report titled Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Preliminary Observations on DoD’s Approach to 
Managing Requirements for New Systems, Existing Assets, and Systems Development, 
stated,  
Without better visibility and performance evaluation, DoD does not have 
all the information it needs to validate the demand for ISR assets, to 
optimize the capability offered by these assets, to achieve a joint approach 
to employing its ISR assets, and to acquire new systems that best support 
warfighting needs. (GAO, 2007) 
Therefore, it is imperative that program managers are armed with accurate and 
defendable MOPs for ISR systems when competing for DoD ISR funding. 
ROI analysis provides decision-makers with data to evaluate system or 
organizational performance.  Department of Defense Directive 8115.01 “implements 
policy and assigns responsibilities for the management of DoD IT investments as 
portfolios within the DoD Enterprise” (DoD, 2005, p. 1). An IT Investment Portfolio, as 
defined in DoD Instruction 8115.02, “includes outcome performance measures (mission, 
functional or administrative measures) and an expected return on investment” (DoD, 
2006, p. 12).  Software capable of providing ROI analysis in near real-time will provide a 
distinct advantage to IT portfolio managers. 
This research will benefit Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
(SPAWAR) management by providing near-real-time automated ROI data on the 
operational performance of CCOP systems.  Military budget cuts and increasing demand 
for technologically advancing SIGINT systems result in difficult choices for acquisition 
executives and funding managers for SIGINT collection systems.  Providing effective 
and efficient performance measurements for SIGINT collection systems will aid 
decision-makers as they face these difficult budgetary choices. The results of this 
research will ultimately aid the U.S. Navy’s Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) CCOP 
Program Office (OPNAV N201) and SPAWAR management in making decisions during 
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The benefit of this research is not limited to Navy CCOP systems alone because 
software that applies KVA methodology can benefit many other organizations within the 
DoD and in the civilian sector.   GaussSoft KVA software has been implemented in over 
200 civilian companies and the KVA framework has been applied to many DoD 
processes to provide ROI analysis of IT systems. 
F. ORGANIZATION 
In this section, we provide an overview of the information that we will present in 
the remainder of the thesis.  In Chapter II, we conduct a literature review that spans our 
problem space.  First, we briefly review the work of Rios, Lambeth and Clapp, and 
Homer in developing a process for conducting ROI analysis of Navy CCOP systems 
using the KVA methodology.  We highlight the discovery of a database that meets many 
of the recommendations of the previous researchers and allows for near-real-time ROI 
analysis.  We also explain the benefits of this database over the previously evaluated 
human-in-the-loop reports.  Next, we discuss those issues that are specific to systems in a 
classified environment and how they affected our research.  Finally, we examine five 
cases of software failure in order to determine the lessons learned from each and how 
they can be applied to our work.  These combined lessons learned are distilled into what 
we consider to be the top five software implementation issues.  We discuss the relevance 
of each issue and how we attempted to mitigate its effects. 
Chapter III is a discussion of our methodology for successfully creating a 
software solution.  We describe the Unified Process for software development and the 
benefits of using it.  We examine the Inception, Elaboration, Construction, and Transition 
phases of the Unified Process and briefly describe how we used the process during our 
research.  Next, we detail our approach to requirements analysis over the Inception and 
Elaboration phases.  This section highlights the important information contained in our 
Vision Document, use cases, and System Software Requirements (SSR).  Our complete 
Vision Document and SSR can be found in Appendices A and B, respectively. 
In Chapter IV, we discuss our design strategy and implementation plan during the 
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Specification (SDS) for the ideal software solution.  The complete SDS can be found in 
Appendix C.  During the course of the study, we were forced to reevaluate our project 
goals and create a less ambitious prototype outside of the confines of the Unified Process. 
Therefore, we discuss the design considerations of this prototype as well. 
Chapter V begins with a brief summary of the roadblocks that hindered our 
implementation of a software solution.  Next, we detail the discovery of another new data 
set, its importance, and our attempts to incorporate it into our research.  We then provide 
an overview of the testing we conducted on our prototype as well as an analysis of the 
COTS software options.  Finally, we discuss our ROI calculations and provide a detailed 
description of the prototype’s functionality.   
In Chapter VI, we provide our conclusions on the research as well as 
recommendations for future work.  This is directly followed by three appendixes 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW ON SOFTWARE 
IMPLEMENTATION 
B. EVOLUTION OF KVA METHODOLOGY AND SOFTWARE SOLUTION 
The first step in our literature review is to assume that previous KVA analysis 
assumptions for Navy CCOP systems are valid.  These assumptions provide the 
algorithms necessary to process CCOP performance data.  The next step is to assume that 
the GaussSoft software functionality is the standard by which we will measure our 
software implementation.  Previous theses have provided the foundation on which these 
assumptions are made, and this section of our thesis will set the stage for the software 
solution needed to provide ROI analysis for CCOP systems.  This review is not meant to 
provide an in-depth look at the previous works; all of the previous works are available 
through the Naval Postgraduate School. 
1. FIRST STUDY: ROI & KVA PROCESS FOR CCOP 
Rios’s thesis provided a proof of concept for applying the KVA methodology to 
Navy CCOP systems.  His research was focused on supplying Navy ISR portfolio 
managers with a standardized ROI analysis that incorporates surrogate revenues based on 
imbedded knowledge in process outputs.  Rios investigated ROI and the dilemma facing 
non-profit organizations, such as the DoD, when they attempt to assign a value to their 
services and products.  He highlighted the fact that the DoD is better suited to provide a 
cost analysis for its personnel and systems because there are no revenue values associated 
with the outputs generated by DoD human and IT systems.  Although ISR systems and 
operators do not generate a product that is sold with a monetary value, Rios investigated 
and applied market comparables similar to reports generated by the Intelligence 
Collection Process (ICP) to formulate an estimated price-per-output.  Subject-matter 
experts in the fields of Navy ISR operations, KVA theory, and Navy CCOP systems were 
used to apply the KVA methodology to Navy CCOP systems.  The KVA valuation 
framework that was created used the Kleiglight (KL) report as the output of Navy CCOP 
systems to conduct performance analysis.  The KL report is a classified SIGINT report 
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operators, CCOP systems, processes, and sub-processes required to generate the KL 
reports.  As a result, Rios’s research demonstrated the applicability of applying the KVA 
methodology to CCOP systems and operators producing KL reports as an output.  The 
study provided an ROI analysis, with KVA valuation, for a realistic sample of CCOP 
systems and operators on a typical six-month deployment (Rios, 2005). Rios states, “The 
solution to the valuation of IT systems has been referred to as one of the ‘holy grails’ of 
the Information Systems (IS) field” (2005, p. 46).  Rios’s research laid the foundation on 
the quest for this “holy grail.”  In his conclusion, Rios wrote,  
It was the goal of this research to provide the means to extract measures of 
value and effectiveness to the CCOP Program office through the use of the 
Housel-Kanevsky Knowledge Value Added (KVA) Methodology. 
Applying KVA to the USS READINESS Case Study showed that the 
program managers could build metrics that are meaningful and useful in 
performing sound financial analysis of each system’s performance at the 
process and subprocess level. KVA analysis also identified a new category 
and source of raw data which can provide insights into the relationship of 
cost and value of organizations, processes, and asset investments. This 
new data allows managers and senior decision makers to discuss the 
“value” of seemingly intangible assets in a defensible, empirical and 
replicable manner. Lastly, KVA facilitates the transformation and 
continuous process improvement of the DoD’s global intelligence mission. 
Through KVA analysis, the operational value of CCOP systems can be 
measured and managed to ensure a responsible stewardship of the nation’s 
resources and ensure that the soldiers and sailors who use these systems 
are receiving the right tools with the right capabilities required to perform 
their duties in defense of the nation. (2005, pp. 46–47) 
Rios provided several key recommendations for future ROI analysis of CCOP 
systems.  The first recommendation was that KVA performance data needed to be 
accessible in near real-time.  Second, CCOP performance data, due to the classification of 
the systems and reports being generated, was located on various classified networks and 
needed to reside in one domain for processing ease.  It was also recommended by the 
SPAWAR sponsor that CCOP performance data be analyzed over a longer period to 
provide a more established performance baseline.  Lastly, the study researched KVA 
software and recommended GaussSoft as the KVA valuation software to be used on 
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2. SECOND STUDY: OPERATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION 
METHODOLOGY 
Lambeth and Clapp’s (2007) thesis was the second study in a series of research 
efforts to provide ROI analysis using the KVA methodology for Navy CCOP systems.  
Rios’s study laid the foundation for applying KVA analysis to CCOP, and Lambeth and 
Clapp expanded on the research by transitioning from the hypothetical crew and system 
in Rios’s study to real-world data collected from CCOP systems and three different crews 
onboard USS GONZALEZ (DDG 66) during an 18-month deployment.  Lambeth and 
Clapp refined the assumptions and methodologies of Rios by providing costs and Time to 
Learn (TTL) calculations for two additional CCOP systems.  Their study reaffirmed that 
the assumptions for processes associated with the ICP and market comparable data were 
still valid.  KL reports remained as an output, and they added another operator-created 
SIGINT report—SIGINT Technical Report Using Models (STRUM)—as an output as 
well.  These outputs were assigned a weighted value based on priority and complexity. 
Lambeth and Clapp parsed the KVA performance data by hand from KL reports, and 
they found this task to be tedious and cumbersome.   
Their findings led to several conclusions about CCOP system performance and 
provided ROI analysis of CCOP systems.  Performing the KVA analysis also led to 
insight about how crew proficiency, system tasking, and location positively or negatively 
affected the ROI of CCOP systems.  In the end, Lambeth and Clapp further validated the 
use of KVA analysis for CCOP systems with a trial implementation aboard DDG 66 
(Lambeth & Clapp, 2007). 
Recommendations for their research included the creation of a community-wide 
database with explanations for the KVA assumptions that were made for individual 
systems. This would include time to learn (TTL) calculations for ISR systems and human 
cost estimators for operators of ISR systems.  While the study did provide KVA analysis, 
recommendations were made that a near-real-time implementation of KVA analysis be 
made to support not only CCOP program managers but also Cryptologic Resource 
Coordinators (CRC) within strike groups.  If KVA analysis was completed near real-time, 
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performance, and the CRC could also seek out reasons for lack of CCOP performance, 
such as lack of crew proficiency.  Qualitative analysis such as system position and 
tasking was recommended in addition to KVA analysis to provide more robust insight.  
Lastly, Lambeth and Clapp proposed that GaussSoft software was still the only software 
suited for use as a KVA analysis tool.  It was noted that GaussSoft was not accredited for 
use in Secret Compartmentalized Information (SCI) spaces, and Lambeth and Clapp 
recommended that the process for GaussSoft accreditation be started (Lambeth & Clapp, 
2007, pp. 41–43). 
3. THIRD STUDY: OPTIONS TO IMPLEMENT 
The third study, by Homer (2009), used the previous work of Rios and Lambeth 
and Clapp to provide an implementation plan for producing KVA analysis of all CCOP 
systems on board Navy ships.  Homer analyzed the CCOP performance data required to 
produce KVA analysis and determined that not all data needed was within the KL report.  
Specifically, he identified critical data such as CCOP systems used to generate a KL 
report and total work time needed to complete the KL report.  Homer also identified non-
critical data points, such as location and date-time group, to provide qualitative analysis.  
Homer proposed a form to capture the necessary data and provided three implementation 
options to provide KVA analysis on all afloat CCOP systems.  The first option was to use 
the data capture form and provide a stand-alone laptop for CCOP operators to input the 
necessary performance data when generating KL reports on deployment.  The second 
option was to create a new message to be transmitted along with the KL report that 
captured the required performance data associated with the KL report.  The third option 
was to change the KL report message format in order to capture all of the CCOP 
performance data needed for KVA analysis.  Homer recommended that the first option be 
implemented because of the time and money advantages associated with it, despite the 
fact that near-real-time KVA analysis would not be achieved because the stand-alone 
laptop would travel with CCOP systems and then return to SPAWAR after deployment 
for KVA analysis (Homer, 2009). 
At the conclusion of Homer’s work, while presenting his findings, SPAWAR 
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previous NPS researchers were not aware of.  Homer recommended that this new data set 
be investigated for performance data required to conduct KVA analysis.  Additionally, he 
suggested that KL reporting might not be the complete measuring stick for CCOP system 
performance because it varied by crew, location, and tasking (Homer, 2009, pp. 37–39).   
C. INVESTIGATING NEW DATA SET 
The new data set discovered at the end of Homer’s research is the reason that this 
study has veered away from the implementation plan suggested by Homer.  Had previous 
researchers been aware of the data set, they would likely have sought to implement a 
KVA software solution more expeditiously as well.  Previous works have shown that KL 
reporting is subject to crews, location, and tasking and does not reflect the complete 
value-utilization of CCOP systems.  SPAWAR system experts have identified that the 
new data set is a direct output of CCOP systems.  This data set fulfills many of the 
recommendations made by previous researchers by providing a single, combined source 
of CCOP data, over a long timeframe, that can be accessed in near real-time.  The new 
data set is an automated output from CCOP systems based on the electromagnetic wave 
signals that are collected as input, and the software solution will need to transform these 
data into valid inputs for KVA analysis. 
KL reporting appeared not to be a complete representation of CCOP performance. 
To demonstrate why this is the case, the analogy of a “cop on the beat” will be used.  If a 
police officer was hired to patrol an area for 20 years and if he made very few arrests in 
those 20 years, is the ROI of the officer negatively affected?  The officer has been 
walking the beat as he was hired to do.  Arrests are not the only measure of performance 
for the officer because his presence and observations while on patrol are also an output 
that needs to be accounted for as a deterrent to crime, among other reasons.  Similarly, 
the CCOP systems are designed to provide SIGINT whether a signal of interest is 
identified or not.  Just because KL reports are not being generated does not mean that the 
systems are not collecting and processing electromagnetic waves.  The new data set is an 
output of the signals that are collected and processed automatically by the CCOP 
systems, while the KL reporting can be equated to the police officer making an arrest.  
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location.  Therefore, the new data set is a more objective representation of CCOP system 
performance. 
D. SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEM 
While the failure rates for software implementation have decreased over the years, 
the relatively low success rate for large-scale software systems remains a serious problem 
that resulted in an estimated waste of $55 billion in 2004.  In creating its annual CHAOS 
reports, the Standish Group studied over 40,000 projects during a 10-year period (1994–
2004).  During that time, project success rates increased from 16% to 34% of all projects.  
Project failure rates declined from 31% to 15% of all projects.  The Standish Group 
defined failures as those systems that do not function as intended or are never used at all.  
In the most recent of these surveys, 51% of projects were considered ‘challenged.’  These 
projects were over time, over budget, and/or lacking critical features and requirements.  
The average cost overrun of all projects in 2004 was 43%, down from 180% in 1994.  
Although there may have been further successes in the intervening six years, software 
development and implementation remains a highly failure-prone industry, resulting in 
tens of billions of dollars in yearly losses.  In order to increase our chance of success and 
to provide general guidance, we examined five cases of software failure to determine 
common issues that lead to failure.  
E. FIVE CASES OF IT IMPLEMENTATION FAILURE 
1. DENVER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT BAGGAGE HANDLING 
SYSTEM 
The Denver airport attempted to implement a $230-million, high-tech, 
computerized baggage-handling system that was finally cancelled in 2005 after a decade 
of work.  The system was designed to use computers and thousands of remote-controlled 
carts operating on a mostly underground 21-mile-long track.  The carts would carry 
luggage from the check-in counters to sorting areas and then to flights waiting at airport 
gates.  Each piece of luggage had a bar-coded tag attached that could be scanned by the 
system to ensure proper luggage delivery.  The system was designed and built by BAE 
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Washington-based company that consults on troubled IT projects, described what 
happened:   
There are a few lessons that large companies just don’t seem to learn.  The 
first lesson is that the best way to build a large, complex system is to 
evolve it from a small system that works.  No one bothered to get a small 
system up and running in the first place—they went for the big bang.  
Once the system gets to a certain point there is an attitude that the project 
is too big to fail, that we “have to make it work now.”  There is an 
unwillingness in upper management to believe that things are as bad as 
they are. (as cited in Weiss, 2005, p. 1) 
Mark Keil, a professor of computer information systems at Georgia State 
University and a researcher on failed IT projects, said that the project should have been 
cancelled in 1994 when the system failed to work as designed.  There were so many 
problems with the system that it even delayed the opening of the airport by approximately 
16 months at a cost of $340 million.  By the time the airport opened, it had resorted to 
manual baggage handling for all inbound flights at an additional cost of $70 million.  
Work on the system finally stopped in 2005 after more than a decade of trying to get it 
operational (Weiss, 2005).   
The lesson learned from this case is that any software project should start with a 
small working prototype that is incrementally tested and built upon.  This will ensure that 
there is always a working system and that the problems that must be addressed at any one 
time are relatively small.  We initially created a rapid prototype that captured the absolute 
minimum functionality required of our system.  Since it is entirely possible that this 
program will become quite large, it will be important to continue to make small 
incremental changes.  
2. FBI’S VIRTUAL CASE FILE 
In September 2000, Congress approved $379.8 million for the FBI Information 
Technology Upgrade Project, which was eventually split into three parts and became 
known as Trilogy.  The information presentation component would provide all 56 FBI 
field offices with new Dell Pentium PCs running Microsoft Office as well as with new 
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secure local-area and wide-area networks over which the new hardware could be fully 
utilized.  The user application component would become the Virtual Case File (VCF) 
(Goldstein, 2005). 
The initial purpose of the software portion of Trilogy was to make the five most 
heavily used investigative applications accessible via a web interface in order to rebuild 
the FBI’s intranet and to identify a way to replace the FBI’s 40-plus investigative 
applications, including the obsolete Automated Case Support (ACS) system.  In May and 
June 2001, the FBI awarded Trilogy contracts to two government contractors: DynCorp 
for the hardware and network infrastructure and SAIC for software.  The original delivery 
date for all three components was the middle of 2004.  More important, instead of paying 
a fixed price for the components, the FBI used cost-plus-award fee contracts, which 
meant the Bureau would be responsible for any unforeseen or additional costs.  After the 
9/11 attacks, the inability of FBI agents to share basic information using their obsolete 
systems became a front-page scandal.  At this point, it was decided that the current plan 
for the software portion would not make agents more effective (Goldstein, 2005).  
The Bureau eventually decided that it needed an entirely new database, graphical 
user interface (GUI), and applications that would allow agents and intelligence analysts 
to share investigation information.  The new system would host millions of records 
containing information on everything from witnesses, suspects, and informants to 
evidence such as documents, photos, and recordings.  The new system was dubbed the 
Virtual Case File (VCF).  The Bureau wanted to provide the software to agents as fast as 
possible.  Unfortunately, the FBI did not have an enterprise architecture blueprint to 
guide hardware and software investment decisions.  The importance of an enterprise 
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This blueprint describes at a high level an organization’s mission and 
operations, how it organizes and uses technology to accomplish its tasks, 
and how the IT system is structured and designed to achieve those 
objectives.  Besides describing how an organization operates currently, the 
enterprise architecture also states how it wants to operate in the future, and 
includes a road map—a transition plan—for getting there. (Goldstein, 
2005, p. 4)   
Without an enterprise architecture as a guide, a team of FBI agents had to feel 
their way in the dark to determine how the organization currently operated and how that 
should be translated into the VCF system (Goldstein, 2005).  
In December 2001, the FBI asked SAIC to stop building the web front end and to 
devise a new application, database, and GUI to completely replace ACS.  In January 
2002, the FBI requested an additional $70 million to accelerate Trilogy. The request was 
approved for $78 million.  DynCorp committed to delivering its components by July 
2002, and SIAC agreed to deliver the initial version of the VCF in December 2003.  
SAIC and the FBI had committed to creating a completely new system in 22 months that 
would replace ACS all at once in a flash cutover.  In other words, agents would log off 
ACS at the end of one week and log on to VFC the next Monday.  Once this occurred, 
there was no going back to ACS, and there was no backup plan if the flash cutover did 
not work.  Fortunately for the FBI, a flash cutover attempt never took place (Goldstein, 
2005). 
From this point forward, the project was continually delayed by various factors.  
Some of the major factors included no formal project schedules or milestones; 
incompatible functional pieces of code; turnover of key IT management personnel; an 
extremely bloated, low-level requirements document; unnecessary creation of software 
from scratch; massive numbers of change requests, including new functionality and 
requirement changes; and a lack of hardware on which to test the developed system.  In 
December 2002, Congress approved another $123.2 million for Trilogy, the total cost of 
which had now reached $581 million.  On December 13, 2003, SAIC delivered the VCF, 
and the FBI declared it Dead on Arrival (DOA).  The FBI found 17 functional 
deficiencies it wanted fixed before the system was deployed.  An arbitrator’s findings, 
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deficiencies, 19 were the FBI’s fault (requirement changes) and the other 40 were SAIC’s 
errors.  In June the FBI contracted an independent reviewer, Aerospace Corp., to review 
the December 2003 delivery of the VFC.  During a hearing on February 3, 2005, Senator 
Judd Gregg (R-NH) disclosed the following from the report: 
The [VCF] architecture was developed without adequate assessment of 
alternatives and conformance to various architectural standards, and in a 
way that precluded the incorporation of significant commercial off-the-
shelf software. Furthermore, high-level documents, including the concept 
of operations, systems architecture, and system requirements were neither 
complete nor consistent, and did not map to user needs. Finally, the 
requirements and design documentation were incomplete, imprecise, 
requirements and design tracings have gaps, and the software cannot be 
maintained without difficulty. And it is therefore unfit for use. (Goldstein, 
2005, p. 10) 
The FBI officially ended the VCF portion of Trilogy in April 2005, with a loss of 
at least $105 million on unusable code.  The next month, the FBI announced it would buy 
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software at an undisclosed cost to be deployed in 
phases over the next four years.  The project, called Sentinel, was expected to cost $425 
million dollars and should have been operational in 2009.  Currently, Sentinel is not 
expected to be operational until early 2011. The project is over budget and could possibly 
get caught in IT cost-cutting by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  Until 
Sentinel is in place, the FBI will continue to rely on basically the same combination of 
paper records and obsolete software that the VCF was meant to replace (Stokes, n.d.). 
The lesson learned from this case is the importance of creating an enterprise 
architecture for an organization and detailed requirements documents for individual 
software projects.  Additionally, the creation of a high-quality requirements document is 
dependant on adequate communication between customers, developers, and users.  
Another issue is the complexity involved when working with multiple contractors and 
multiple stakeholders.  Our requirements document captures the needed high-level 
functionality without dictating how the individual functions should be implemented.  
Additionally, we used an iterative process to build our requirements incrementally along 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= - 19 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
3. BANK OF AMERICA’S MASTERNET 
Bank of America began a project to manage all of its trust accounts in 1982 called 
MasterNet, and in 1988, the project was cancelled when Bank of America sold all of its 
remaining trust accounts.  Although Bank of America did successfully implement several 
IT systems during the same time frame, MasterNet was not one of them.  The most 
glaring factor in the failure of MasterNet was that Bank of America neglected to keep 
pace with technology during the 1970s.  Yet, Bank of America executives sought to jump 
into the 1990s with the technology created during the implementation of MasterNet.  The 
complexity of trust accounts combined with the complexity of the MasterNet project 
posed many difficult issues for implementation.  MasterNet project managers attempted 
to implement all functionality inputs from everyone in Bank of America that had an 
interest in managing trust accounts. As a result, 3.5 million lines of code were developed.  
Project managers also strayed away from existing technology within Bank of America in 
favor of new technologies, in spite of the fact that few people working on the project 
were familiar with them.  Because of software expansion and increasing complexity, the 
hardware requirements were met with poorly implemented, low-quality components.  The 
MasterNet project continued to expand in software and hardware complexity until its 
failure (Szilagyi, n.d.). 
Despite all of the issues surrounding the project, Bank of America executives 
continually promoted the success of MasterNet to the public and placed unrealistic 
deadlines on MasterNet program managers.  As a result, MasterNet was not properly 
tested before it was implemented, and system failures resulted in millions of dollars in 
losses being paid to the owners of Bank of America trust accounts.  Bank of America lost 
or sold $38 billion dollars worth of trust investments as a result of MasterNet’s failure.  
Five billion dollars was allocated for technology initiatives inside Bank of America, and 
millions of these dollars were used for MasterNet (Szilagyi, n.d.).   
Although executive management committed significant financial resources to 
MasterNet, Bank of America executives were focused on several other financial setbacks 
during the 1980s.  Organizational faults between lines of communication from executive 
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complexity of MasterNet.  MasterNet was a failed implementation of an information 
system because of several errors, and it is an important case study in identifying 
contributing factors that lead to software-implementation failure as well as project 
management failure as a whole (Szilagyi, n.d.).   
The lesson learned from this case is the importance of setting realistic project 
goals.  In this case, unrealistic deadlines resulted in a system that was not properly tested 
prior to implementation.  When it becomes clear that a deadline will not be met, the 
project must be reevaluated and a new, realistic deadline should be created.  We 
constantly reevaluated our deadlines and were forced to simplify our prototype due to an 
inability to access needed resources in a timely matter.      
4. THERAC-25 MEDICAL ACCELERATOR 
The Therac-25 is a computerized radiation therapy machine or a medical linear 
accelerator (linac).  Linacs accelerate electrons to create high-energy beams that can 
destroy relatively shallow tumors with minimal impact on the surrounding healthy tissue.  
In order to treat deeper tissues, the electron beam must be converted into x-ray photons. 
Between June 1985 and January 1987, there were six known accidents involving massive 
overdoses by the Therac-25 that resulted in either death or serious injury.  While there 
were numerous issues with incident reporting and apparent negligence by the 
manufacturer in informing users about possible dangers, we will focus on the problems 
with the device itself because they pertain to our study of software implementation issues 
(Leveson & Turner, 1993).   
Two major problems with the Therac-25 were responsible for the massive 
overdoses.  The first issue was a combination of software bugs and poor program design 
that provided operators with cryptic error messages and allowed them to repeatedly retry 
failed treatments as standard operating procedure.  There were at least two specific 
repeatable situations in which the software allowed a massive overdose to be 
administered.  Both involved a race condition that caused the machine to be activated in 
an incorrect state.  A race condition is a programming flaw that causes an output to be 
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were each attributed to two of the overdose cases, accounting for four of the six total 
incidents.  The other two cases were never attributed to any specific scenario, but 
researchers assumed that they were also caused by other race conditions and/or unsafe 
coding practices (Leveson & Turner, 1993). 
The second major problem with the Therac-25 was the lack of any hardware 
safety features.  This meant that the machine relied entirely upon software to ensure safe 
operation.  The software for the Therac-25 as well as for the Therac-20 was built on 
software originally created for the Therac-6.  The Therac-20 was basically an older, 
larger version of the Therac-25 with similar capabilities that included robust hardware 
interlocks to ensure safe operation.  The Therac-25 had borrowed software routines from 
the Therac-20 for its electron mode.  When users of the Therac-20 became aware of the 
issues with the Therac-25, they tried to determine if the Therac-20 suffered from the 
same software issues.  After some experimentation, it was determined that certain 
situations attributed to the same software error resulted in blown fuses on the Therac-20.  
In the case of the Therac-20, the software error was nothing more than a nuisance 
because the protective circuits for monitoring the electron-beam scanning would not 
allow the beam to turn on at an improper setting (Leveson & Turner, 1993).  
The lesson learned from this case is that focusing on particular software errors is 
not the way to make a system safe.  Almost all complex software systems can be made to 
behave in an unexpected fashion in specific scenarios.  The primary mistakes in this 
scenario involved poor software-engineering practices, resulting in faulty code and the 
creation of a machine that relied on software for safe operation.  The specific coding 
mistakes are not nearly as important as the overall unsafe design of the software.  
Although it is not always practical to include hardware safety features, they should be 
included when possible, especially in systems that can cause death or serious injury.  
Although it is not possible or necessary for our system to incorporate hardware safety 
features, we used a software development methodology that should result in fairly error-
free code.  Our choice of an iterative and incremental methodology ensured that thorough 
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5. PATRIOT MISSILE FAILURE 
This final case is an example of a relatively simple programming error within a 
military weapon system that ultimately resulted in the deaths of 28 Service members.  
During the Persian Gulf War, on February 25, 1991, a Patriot missile battery based in 
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, failed to intercept an incoming Scud missile.  The missile struck 
an American Army barracks, killing 28 Service members and wounding an additional 99.  
A report by the General Accounting Office (GAO), entitled Patriot Missile Defense:  
Software Problem Led to System Failure at Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, detailed the cause of 
the failure (Arnold, 1996). 
The general problem was an inaccurate calculation (caused by computer 
arithmetic errors) of the time since boot (last system startup).  Specifically, the system’s 
internal clock kept time in tenths of seconds. This time was multiplied by 1/10 to produce 
the time in seconds.  The problem occurred because the calculation was performed using 
a 24-bit fixed-point register that resulted in a chopped value of 1/10, inducing a small 
error.  When the small chopping error was multiplied by the large number giving time in 
tenths of a second, a significant error resulted.  At the time of the incident, the Patriot 
battery had been active for approximately 100 hours, resulting in a time error of about 
0.34 seconds.  Since a Scud missile travels at about 1,676 meters per second, the missile 
would have traveled about 560 meters in the error time frame.  This distance was great 
enough that the missile was outside the range gate that the Patriot system tracked.  In 
other words, because of the time error, the missile was not where the system expected it 
to be and, therefore, was not successfully engaged (Arnold, 1996). 
There are some additional factors that should be considered when analyzing this 
incident.  The effect of the inaccuracy on the range-gate calculation was directly 
proportional to the target’s velocity and the length of time the system had been running.  
The system specification called for aircraft speeds and 14-hour continuous operation.  
The system was not designed to be used against Mach-6 missiles or to be operated for 
100 continuous hours.  It is clear that both parties were at fault: the military for relying 
upon a system in a situation that it was not designed for, and the manufacturer for 
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the military been made aware of these limitations, it could have required periodic 
rebooting of the system to maintain an accurate-enough time since boot.  The best 
solution would have been to modify the software, which was actually so simple that 
patched software arrived via air one day after the error was identified.  Had the 
manufacturer originally taken the negligible effort to create more robust code, this 
incident would probably not have occurred (Dershowitz, n.d.). 
There are several lessons learned from this case.  The first is the importance of 
ensuring that the specifications for a system accurately reflect how it will be used.  This, 
again, highlights the importance of creating a detailed requirements document that fully 
captures a system’s functionality.  The second lesson is that software should not be 
created that meets only the bare minimum of a requirement.  Developers should 
anticipate that a product might be used in a situation surpassing its specifications, and 
they should create code that will mitigate this risk.  This is particularly useful for 
software running mission critical systems that can be made more robust with negligible 
additional cost.  Our system is not mission critical and is unlikely to be used in a situation 
that exceeds its specification.  The Patriot missle system did, however, fail due to a 
simple arithmetic error.  The third lesson learned, one that relates directly to our system, 
is the importance of testing system calculations.  Our system is prone to arithmetic errors 
due to the calculations required to produce ROI values.  We tested our software 
thoroughly to ensure that arithmetic rounding would not skew our results.  
F. SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES FOR MILITARY AND 
CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS 
While military systems suffer from all of the same issues as commercial systems, 
there are some additional considerations.  The major issue that affects all military systems 
is the need for systems to undergo certification and accreditation before being authorized 
for use on military networks.  The process is extremely long, complicated, and 
manpower-intensive.  Nevertheless, it is a necessary process that ensures only adequately 
secure software is installed on the network.  The primary issue that must be considered is 
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complete the process.  This delay must be factored into all software deployment timelines 
for military networks.        
An additional issue pertains to military systems deployed in a classified 
environment.  Clearance requirements can make it more difficult to receive support for 
systems installed in these environments.  Ensuring that contractors with adequate 
clearance will be available to provide direct support is essential for successful 
employment of classified systems.  This issue directly affected our efforts because we 
were unable to personally work on the computer systems at SPAWAR.  The end result 
was a simplification of our prototype, and a contractor was assigned to create a portion of 
the software solution.   
G. TOP FIVE SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
1. SLOPPY DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES RESULTING IN 
SOFTWARE ERRORS 
Sloppy development practices that cause software errors seem to be a reoccurring 
issue that plagues software systems.  They were certainly the primary problem with both 
the Denver airport’s baggage-handling system and with the Therac-25 medical 
accelerator.  The baggage-handling system had so many errors that it never actually 
operated correctly and resulted in a total loss of at least $640 million.  Errors in the 
Therac-25 software resulted in the deaths of five individuals and serious injury to at least 
one other.  Although not discussed in detail in the cases, software errors were also 
attributed to the destruction of the Mariner-1 rocket in 1962, the collapse of the AT&T 
network in 1990, the explosion of the Ariane-5 rocket in 1996, and the loss of the Mars 
Climate Orbiter in 1998.  All of the errors were relatively simple: a transcription error in 
a single formula, a single line of buggy code, an unhandled exception, and a units 
mismatch, respectively.  All of these errors could have been discovered and corrected 
with adequate testing and evaluation (Martin, 2008; Barker, 2007; Lloyd, 1999; Gleick, 
1996).   
We used the Unified Process, an iterative and incremental development process, 
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through further iterations, the additions had to be kept small to ensure that each version 
could be thoroughly tested.  Additionally, we ensured that unexpected values would 
result in meaningful errors rather than in causing unexpected behavior. 
2. BADLY DEFINED SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
The FBI’s VCF is a perfect example of how a lack of well-defined requirements 
can delay and eventually destroy a software project.  Three major requirements issues 
affected the development of the VCF.  The first was a lack of an enterprise architecture.  
Such a blueprint is extremely helpful whenever an organization is creating the 
requirements for a major software project but becomes essential when upgrading the IT 
infrastructure of an entire organization.  An enterprise architecture would have helped 
stop the creation of the second problem: a bloated, low-level requirements document.  
Generally, a requirements document should consist of a list of features that describe at a 
high level what functions the program should perform.  The developers then decide how 
each of the functions should be implemented in the program. 
In other words, the requirements documents should dictate the whats but not the 
hows.  Unfortunately, according to Matthew Patton, who worked as a security engineer 
for SAIC for three months, the VCF documents contained a lot of the latter.  In an 
interview with Patton, he stated, “They were trying to design the system layout and then 
the whole application logic before they had actually even figured out what they wanted 
the system to do” (as cited in Goldstein, 2005, p. 7).  Basically, rather than specifying 
which overall functions were required, the FBI created a huge requirements document 
that defined in great detail how certain pages should look and operate.  Additionally, once 
the requirements document was accepted, the FBI created a third problem by introducing 
additional requirement changes throughout the development process.  There should be 
very minimal requirement changes once both the customer and developer have accepted 
the document.  A change made late in a program’s development could require 
significantly more work to implement than if the same change had been made in the 
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The Patriot missile failure also had a clear issue with requirements.  If the military 
intended to continuously operate Patriot batteries to guard against Mach-6 Scud missiles, 
then it should have included those values in its specification.  Because its specification 
was for defending against much slower-moving aircraft and only 14 hours of operation, 
the manufacturer delivered a system that would only work reliably up to those maximum 
speed and time values. 
Through analysis of the previous studies and discussions with stakeholders and 
users, we were able to create a detailed requirements document that adequately captures 
the requested functionality without dictating how the program should be implemented.  
When we present the prototype to the stakeholders for evaluation, we will further refine 
the requirements as needed.  
3. POOR COMMUNICATION AMONG CUSTOMERS, 
DEVELOPERS, AND USERS 
Without adequate interaction among customers, users, and developers, a software 
project is likely to fail.  The mostly likely outcome will be the delivery of a system that 
the customer does not want.  This issue is closely tied to the development of a high-
quality requirements document.  Communication must continue even after the 
requirements document has been accepted by all parties.  Although the requirements 
document defines the high-level functions required by the customer, continuous 
communication is required to further refine the requirements and other specific aspects of 
a system.  Communication with users is essential for designing a system that is easy to 
use and that meets the users’ needs.  It is entirely possible to create a system that fulfills 
all of the customer’s requirements but is never utilized because users find it too 
complicated or unwieldy.  During the development of the VCF, the FBI and SAIC had 
regular meetings between developers and various groups of users.  Unfortunately, these 
meetings were not built upon the solid foundation of a high-quality requirements 
document and did little to fix the situation (Goldstein, 2005). 
As previously mentioned, we built upon already captured communication with 
users and customers and conducted additional meeting as necessary to reach a consensus 
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discovered the existence of another new data set that may play an important role in future 
research. 
4. UNMANAGED RISKS 
A fundamental part of software development is the management of risks.  There 
are a couple of ways to approach this issue; one is risk taking by the customer in terms of 
financial losses.  Given the likelihood of failure, a large software project is always a risky 
venture.  Gradually changing an organization’s IT infrastructure greatly reduces the 
amount of risk undertaken at any one time.  The FBI’s decision to completely replace its 
case management system in a flash cutover could not have been much riskier (Goldstein, 
2005).  
Risk management can also be approached in terms of software development.  In 
this case, our discussion focuses on unhandled exceptions.  An unhandled exception is an 
error that generally causes a program to crash or exhibit unexpected behavior because 
programmers did not provide a means of dealing with the error.  The destruction of the 
Ariane 5 rocket was caused by an unhandled exception.  The guidance system for the 
rocket shut down when it tried to convert the sideways velocity of the rocket from a 64-
bit format to a 16-bit format and received an overflow error.  A simple error-handling 
routine would have completely avoided this disaster (Gleick, 1996).  
Although they were not caused by unhandled exceptions, the radiation overdoses 
by the Therac-25 are a good example of an unmanaged software risk.  In this case, 
engineers were sure that it was impossible for the machine to overdose a patient.  They 
had complete faith that the system’s software would provide adequate protection.  From a 
system-engineering point of view, they completely failed to manage risk by not including 
hardware safety features. 
Our primary focus regarding risk management was the proper handling of 
exceptions.  The primary way in which we accomplished this was to make the program as 
user-friendly as possible by providing meaningful error messages when data is entered 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= - 28 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
5. UNREALISTIC OR UNARTICULATED PROJECT GOALS 
Unrealistic or unarticulated project goals are clearly a widespread problem for 
large software projects, as evidenced by at least 51% of the projects studied by the 
Standish Group in 2004 not meeting their project goals.  Although the FBI did a 
somewhat decent job of articulating their goals for Trilogy, the FBI had unrealistic goals 
for both cost and completion time for all three portions of the project.  This problem 
stems from developers underestimating the amount of time a project will take.  In the 
case of Trilogy, both DynCorp and SIAC agreed to an accelerated timeline, but neither 
was able to meet the original timeline with an acceptable product.  Although developers 
should be primarily responsible for setting realistic goals, customers need to have 
experienced personnel who can evaluate a developer’s claims.  As previously noted, the 
FBI’s Sentinel program also had unrealistic goals, and it is currently delayed and over 
budget. 
Although we clearly articulated our project goals, they ended up being unrealistic 
due to unforeseen circumstances.  Our original goal was the creation of a prototype of a 
single software solution that would provide near-real-time ROI analysis of CCOP 
systems.  When we discovered that we would be unable to personally interact with the 
classified database, we had to scale back our goal to producing a prototype that only 
made calculations and displayed the results.  The portion of the program that will interact 
with the database is currently being produced by a contractor at SPAWAR. 
H. SUGGESTED METHODS FOR SUCCESSFUL SOFTWARE 
IMPLEMENTATION 
In order to avoid the previously discussed software development issues, the first 
step in any software development should be the creation of a detailed requirements 
document.  This document forms the basis for the entire project and, in its final form, lists 
all the major functions that must be developed. A working prototype should be the very 
first item created during software engineering.  During each additional iteration, the 
requirements should be  expanded and a new piece of code added and tested.  This will 
ensure that there is always a functional program with no need to piece disparate parts 
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of each iteration.  Additionally, goals and milestones should be constantly evaluated and 
changed if it becomes clear that they cannot be met.  Finally, programmers should seek to 
include robust error handling that will be capable of handling unexpected data entry and 
other errors. 
The previous CCOP studies have made use of continuous customer and user 
feedback in order to determine the best means for providing ROI estimates of CCOP 
system performance.  Planning and risk analysis were conducted for three different 
implementation options.  Subsequent discussions with systems experts revealed the 
database of records as a more accurate source of data for ROI calculations.  This resulted 
in a change to the overall goals and milestones. The planning phase had to be started 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
A. UNIFIED PROCESS 
In order to provide a framework that captures our recommendations for successful 
software implementation, we decided to use the Unified Process for software 
development.  The Unified Process is a popular iterative and incremental process.  In this 
approach, software development progresses incrementally over four phases.  These 
phases are Inception, Elaboration, Construction, and Transition, and they represent the 
level of completeness of the project.  Each phase is organized into a series of  small 
projects called iterations.  Generally, each iteration concludes with the creation of a 
tested, integrated, and executable portion of the final system (Larman, 2005).   
As can be seen in Figure 2, each iteration includes its own business modeling, 
requirements, analysis and design, implementation, test, and deployment activities.  It is 
important to note that this is only an example of possible activities and that they will be 
different for any given project.  Our project incorporates only the requirements, design, 
implementation, and testing activities.  Although each iteration will usually contain some 









Figure 2.  Unified Process 
(Dutchguilder, 2007) 
 
The following is a brief summary of each phase of the Unified Process as 
explained by Larman (2005). 
1. INCEPTION 
Inception is the initial short step that establishes a common vision and basic scope 
for a project.  It includes analysis of approximately 10% of the use cases; an analysis of 
high-level, non-functional requirements; and preparation of the development environment 
so that programming can begin in the Elaboration phase. 
The Inception phase should answer the following kinds of questions: 
 What is the vision and business case for the project? 
 Is it feasible? 
 Should the software be purchased or built? 
 What is a rough range of cost? 
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The purpose of the Inception phase is not to define all the requirements but to 
determine if it is worth a serious investigation in the Elaboration phase.  Inception should 
usually last no longer than a week. 
2. ELABORATION 
Elaboration is the initial series of iterations during which the team does serious 
investigation, programs and tests the core architecture, discovers and clarifies most 
requirements, and mitigates the major risks. 
Elaboration often consists of two or more iterations recommended to last between 
two and six weeks.  Each iteration is timeboxed with a fixed end date.  Elaboration is not 
a detailed design phase and does not involve the creation of throw-away prototypes.  The 
code and design completed during this time are production-quality portions of the final 
system.  This is usually referred to as the executable architecture or architectural baseline. 
The following are key ideas and best practices pertaining to Elaboration: 
 Create iterations that are short, timeboxed, and risk-driven. 
 Start programming early. 
 Design, implement, and test the risky parts of the architecture. 
 Test early, often, and realistically. 
 Constantly adapt based on feedback from users, developers, and testers. 
 Write out most of the use cases and requirements in detail. 
3. CONSTRUCTION 
Construction is the largest phase in the project and involves the iterative 
implementation of the remaining lower risk elements as well as preparation for 
deployment.  Each timeboxed iteration results in an executable release of the software. 
4. TRANSITION 
Transition is the final phase of the project and involves beta testing and 
deployment to users.  The Transition phase may consist of several iterations that 
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5. OUR USE OF THE PROCESS 
Our software development process completed the Inception phase and began the 
Elaboration phase of the Unified Process.  We were unable to create any production-
quality portions of code during the Elaboration phase, but we did succeed in creating a 
throw-away prototype that was extremely useful for customer evaluation.  It is atypical to 
create a throw-away prototype during the Elaboration phase, but this was our only option 
for providing a usable solution for near-real-time ROI analysis during our research.  The 
prototype should therefore be considered as an addendum to our software development 
using the Unified Process.     
B. REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
The results of our requirements analysis were a Vision Document (Appendix A), 
use case diagram, two brief use cases that captured the high-level functions of the 
program, and an SSR (Appendix B).  This process was based on use case analysis and 
spanned both the Inception and Elaboration phases of the Unified Process.  We also 
conducted risk analysis to identify those issues that would prevent us from moving 
forward with the project and examined the feasibility of incorporating COTS software.  
1. USE CASE ANALYSIS 
Use cases are text stories of an actor using a system to meet a goal.  They are used 
to discover and record functional requirements.  An actor is something with behavior 
such as a person, software, or organization.  Use cases are important because they 
emphasize the goals and perspective of the user.  They are generally a more effective 
means of determining requirements than asking for a list of system features (Larman, 
2005). 
The first step of our Inception phase was the creation of a Vision Document and 
two brief use cases.  A brief use case is a terse one-paragraph summary of the main 
success scenario.  By scenario we mean a specific sequence of actions and interactions 
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identified in our Vision Document, and we illustrated their relationship in a use case 
diagram.   
During the Elaboration phase, both use cases were expanded into fully dressed 
use cases.  Fully dressed use cases are highly detailed and structured.  They address all 
expected scenarios and contain supporting sections, such as preconditions and success 
guarantees. The fully dressed use cases were extremely helpful in identifying the major 
functional requirements of the system.  Both of the fully dressed uses cases, and the 
requirements they helped discover, are captured in the SSR (Larman, 2005).   
2. MAJOR FINDINGS  
In our Vision Document, we outlined the positioning of our system.  We noted 
that the capability to provide CCOP system managers with near-real-time  analysis of 
system performance does not currently exist.  Additionally, providing ROI data for these 
systems will provide a means of objectively comparing systems to support future funding 
allocation decisions.   
We also identified the major stakeholders of the system:   
 Non-user stakeholders: 
 CCOP system managers, 
 CCOP operators, and  
 Naval ship captains.  
 User stakeholders: 
 Military Service members and 
 Contractor personnel. 
These users will have varying levels of computer and network knowledge.  
Therefore, the system will need to be user-friendly to accommodate various levels of 
expertise. 
Next, we would have to provide an overview of the product and the three primary 
functions it would need to perform.  The first is extraction of the data needed for KVA 
analysis from the newly discovered database.  The second is conducting KVA analysis 
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system.  The final function is a graphical display of the ROI values in an easy-to-
understand format.  We noted that a fourth and secondary function would be required to 
enter and store additional data needed for the ROI calculations. 
In order to capture these functions, we created brief use cases.  We decided that 
the three major functions could be captured in one use case, ROI Analysis, and the 
secondary function in another, Data Entry.  These use cases capture the two major 
interactions a user would have with the system.  At this stage we considered a user to be 
the sole actor that would interact with the system. 
We then created both of the use cases in a brief format: 
UC-1 
Name: ROI Analysis 
Actors: Users 
Description: Provides users with the ability to select a time period, 
system(s), and ship(s) for ROI analysis.  Once selections are complete, the 
system will pull necessary data from the database and perform ROI 
calculations using previously provided cost, life cycle, and complexity 
values for the selected system(s).  The resulting ROI values will be 
graphically displayed in an easy-to-understand format.  Additional display 
and print options will be provided.    
UC-2 
Name: Data Entry 
Actors: Users 
Description: Provides users with the ability to enter cost, life cycle, and 
complexity data for a given CCOP system.  This data will be stored and 
used for ROI calculations as required. 
The relationship between the user the and use cases can be seen in the use case 
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Figure 3.  Use Case Diagram 
Finally, we summarized the major system features.  Each feature is associated 
with a use case: 
 (UC-1) Automated Data Collection: 
 User Specified Time Period (Day/Month/Year Range) 
 User Specified System(s) 
 User Specified Ship(s) 
 (UC-1) ROI Calculations 
 (UC-1) Graphical Display of ROI Values (various formats) 
 (UC-2) Storage of Cost, Life Cycle, and Complexity Data for Individual 
Systems 
During the Inception phase, we began work on the SSR by listing the non-
functional requirements of the system.  The fully dressed use cases were created during 
the Elaboration phase and used to help identify the functional requirements of the system.  
The requirements have been categorized according to the FURPS+ model: Functional, 
Usability, Reliability, Performance, and Supportability.  A system requirement ID 
number and relevant use case cross reference is provided for each requirement, as shown 
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Use Case Cross 
Reference 
Functional 
001 Provide GUI that allows point–and-click selections UC-1 & UC-2 
002 Provide the capability to make selections using pull-
down menus 
UC-1 & UC-2 
003 Provide the ability for the user to select a time frame 
range at the day/month/year level of granularity 
UC-1 
004 Provide the ability for the user to select one or more 
systems for ROI analysis 
UC-1 
005 Provide the ability for the user to select one or more 
ships for ROI analysis 
UC-1 
006 Check user entries for completeness and correctness  UC-1 & UC-2 
007 Highlight incomplete or incorrect user entries UC-1 & UC-2 
008 Notify the user when data entry has not been 
completed for a selected system(s) 
UC-1 
009 Perform a database search based on user-entered 
parameters 
UC-1 
010 Notify the user when database does not contain data 
needed for ROI calculations 
UC-1 
011 Perform ROI calculations UC-1 
012 Provide the capability to graphically display ROI 
values 
UC-1 
013 Provide the capability for the user to select a 
graphical display format 
UC-1 
014 Provide the capability for user to print the graphical 
display 
UC-1 
015 Provide the capability to return to the main menu 
when complete 









Use Case Cross 
Reference 
016 Provide the capability for the user to enter initial 
cost, recurring cost, life cycle, and complexity for 
individual systems  
UC-2 
017 Display and store user-entered data on individual 
systems (costs, life cycle, complexity) 
UC-2 
018 Notify the user when costs, life cycle, and/or 
complexity data is entered incorrectly 
UC-2 
019 Provide the capability for the user to enter data on 
multiple systems without returning to the main menu 
UC-2 
Usability 
020 Display text with a default size no smaller than 12 pt. __ 
021 Make display colors modifiable by the operator __ 
022 Provide a help dialog that meets industry standards 
for help functionality 
__ 
023 Provide access to electronic documentation __ 
Reliability 
024 Upon complete failure, the system should recover to 
the last-known good state 
__ 
Performance 
025 Be compatible with a variety of hardware 
configurations to allow for user needs 
__ 
026 Provide response to user actions within 1 second __ 
Supportability 
027 Have patch capability to allow for future 
modifications for the software to adapt to new 
operating systems or operating system upgrades 
__ 
028 Be easily migrated to a new operating system after an 
operating system upgrade 
__ 
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Our constraints followed logically from the following requirements: 
 Hardware components of the system will consist of pre-existing desktop or 
laptop computers running a DoD standard version of Microsoft Windows. 
 Software components of the system will utilize OO technology.  The 
system will be compatible and adaptable to an OO environment. 
 The system will be developed using the Unified Process. 
Our SSR also contains a domain model (Figure 4) of the problem.  It is a 
conceptual model that illustrates the relationships between the various entities that are 
important to a software solution to the problem. 
 
Figure 4.  Domain Model for the System 
The following is an explanation of the entities and relationships captured by the 
domain model: Ships contain CCOP systems; each of these systems has a name, initial 
cost, recurring cost, complexity, and life cycle.  Additionally, these systems have outputs.  
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evaluates a CCOP system based on these attributes and produces an ROI.  Two kinds of 
users operate our Software Solution: Service members and contractors.  The ROI is 
specific to a CCOP system and is used by stakeholders.  These stakeholders include ship 
captains, CCOP operators, and CCOP system managers. 
3. RISK ANALYSIS 
We identified not having access to the database as the biggest risk to our project.  
Without access to the database itself, we would not be able to implement the data-
gathering function of the software.  The plan at this time was for SPAWAR to provide us 
with remote access to a system containing a copy of the database through the Joint 
Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) to the NPS Sensitive 
Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF).  
4. COTS SOFTWARE 
Ideally, all four of the functions we identified would be included within one 
software program.  Although the GaussSoft software  includes three of the four functions 
(it cannot pull data from the database), the software is not accredited for use on classified 
military networks.  Microsoft Excel, on the other hand, is accredited and offers enough 
functionality to cover those same three features.  We decided to explore the possibility of 
using a database in conjunction with Excel to provide a working prototype of the 
complete system.  Additionally, we decided to consider the use of already-purchased 
COTS software (GaussSoft) whenever possible.  Even though it cannot be used in a 
classified environment, we could demonstrate to the stakeholders at Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) how it could be used if they decided to move 
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IV. SOFTWARE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
The end result of our requirements analysis was our SSR.  Our SSR contains two 
additional artifacts that helped form the basis for our software design.  The first is system 
sequence diagrams (SSDs) for each of the fully dressed use cases.  The purpose of an 
SSD is to illustrate a use case in a visual format.  It shows in detail how the system is 
designed to handle certain actions.  The second artifact is an operation contract for each 
of the operations identified in the SSDs.  An operation contract identifies the system state 
changes that occur when an operation executes.  We identified 15 operations and created 
a contract for each of them.  The most important portion of an operation contract is the 
post conditions.  Post conditions are not actions to be performed during the operation but 
represent the state of objects after the operation is complete (Larman, 2005).  Contract 
C02: selectROI is provided as an example: 
Contract C02: selectROI 
Operation:       selectROI() 
Cross Reference:   Use Cases:  ROI Analysis 
Preconditions:       - Main menu options displayed 
Postconditions:     - Dialog box displayed with time frame, system(s), and 
ship(s) fields 
The SSDs and remaining operation contracts are available in the SSR in Appendix 
B. 
A. DESIGN OF IDEAL SOFTWARE SOLUTION 
At the end of the Inception phase, we decided that our software design and 
implementation could be split along the four system functions and would begin during 
the first iteration of the Elaboration phase.  The Elaboration phase would consist of two 
iterations.  The first iteration would focus on initial design of the database search.  This 
iteration would conclude with a hard-coded, functional database search.  The second 
iteration would involve finishing the initial design of the overall system in the SDS and 
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risk functionality of the system.  We planned to implement the remaining three functions 
during multiple iterations of the Construction phase. 
During our first iteration of the Elaboration phase, it became apparent that we 
would not be granted remote access to the database at SPAWAR during the course of our 
research.  However, we discovered that the database was already accessible through a 
web interface with various predefined SQL queries.  Although none of the existing 
queries met our needs, we incorporated this method of interfacing with the database into 
our logical architecture.  The logical architecture is the large-scale organization of the 
software classes that make up a program into packages, subsystems, and layers.   
Our logical architecture utilizes a web-based, graphical user interface (GUI) in 
our user interface (IU) layer.  This layer relies on the Domain layer with packages for 
Actions, External Systems, and Output.  The Actions package contains the classes 
required based on an analysis of the operation contracts.  The remaining packages contain 
the major elements of the system such as database access, displays, and printers.  The 
External Systems package is dependent upon the Database class contained within our 
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Figure 5.  Logical Architecture 
Even though we were unable to implement and test any code at this point in the 
Elaboration phase, we decided to continue with the design.  We provided SPAWAR with 
the values we required in a predefined search of the database.  A contractor was assigned 
to implement the search.  We then moved into the second iteration of the Elaboration 
phase and created a Design Class Diagram (DCD) for the system.  This diagram 
illustrates classes, interfaces, and their associations from a design perspective.  Our 
diagram captures all of the operations identified in the SSDs and further clarified in the 
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the Domain Layer of the logical architecture.  Because the DCD defines the operations 
and attributes of each class, it serves as an excellent guide during implementation.  Figure 
6 is the DCD for our system.   
 
Figure 6.  Design Class Diagram 
The following is a verbal description of the operations associated with the Data 
Entry use case.  The user selects Select Data on the main menu of the graphical user 
interface, which calls the selectData procedure of the MainControl class.  The 
MainControl class then calls the DataContol class using the dataEntry procedure.  
DataControl then interacts with the user to create a SystemRecord containing the user-
entered information.  Finally, the user selects Data Complete which calls the 
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At this point in the process, it did not appear that the predefined query to the 
database would be completed with enough time left for us to implement a working 
prototype according to our original design.  We reevaluated our goals and decided that it 
was more important to have a working prototype that could be used for ROI analysis than 
to create a single software solution.  Since analysis of COTS options was already a goal 
of our research, we explored the possibilities afforded by Microsoft Excel.  Because this 
prototype would not contain any production-quality code, it would be a throw-away 
prototype and would be an addendum to the artifacts planned for our software 
development using the Unified Process. 
B. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF SOLUTION PROTOTYPE 
The purpose of this design was to determine how to utilize Excel in order to 
create a prototype that would capture the major functions of our software solution.  
Additionally, the prototype would need to be able to provide near-real-time ROI analysis 
of Navy CCOP systems when combined with the completed predefined query.  Although 
we did not have specific details regarding the format of the predefined query, we knew 
that they could be exported to Excel.  At minimum, we expect the two programs can 
work together via cut-and-paste of the Excel-exported search results into our prototype. 
We decided to logically separate the different use cases by utilizing the multiple 
tabs functionality of Excel.  In this manner, the tabs would also simulate our main menu 
options.  In total, we created four tabs: ROI Analysis, Data Entry, Graphical Display 1, 
and Graphical Display 2.  We designed the interfaces of each of the tabs so that users 
could execute the use cases in the same manner they would for a single software solution.  
Upon selecting the Data Entry tab, users are presented with fields for System, Initial 
Cost, Life Cycle, Monthly Recurring Cost, and Complexity.  Unfortunately, we were 
unable to implement an error message for incomplete entries.  Upon selecting the ROI 
Analysis tab, users are presented with fields for Ship, System, Outputs, and Time Frame.  
This represents the data values that would be returned from a successful database search.  
If the fields are entered correctly, an ROI value is calculated and displayed.  In this 
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incomplete fields or for when data entry was not previously completed for a given 
system.  The graphical display tabs provide two graphical display format options.   
Overall, we found Excel to be a viable COTS solution that could provide the 
needed functionally until a permanent solution could be implemented.  The most 
significant drawback is that a user will need to be experienced with Excel in order to 
adequately make use of the prototype.  It is probably most useful as a proof of concept 
and to generate stakeholder feedback.  Because we used the Unified Process as our 
software development framework, it should be noted that this solution would be 
considered a throw-away prototype.  This is because this prototype could never be 
incrementally improved upon to reach our overall goal of a single software solution.  
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V. SOFTWARE PROTOTYPE/FINDINGS 
A. ROADBLOCKS FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
Because of issues with access to classified information, we were unable to gain 
remote access to the database.  However, we were given access to a website providing 
predefined SQL searches of the database, which return data in an Excel-exportable 
format.  Through various discussions and a return trip to SPAWAR, we determined that a 
predefined SQL search based on our specifications would fulfill our requirements and 
allow for near-real-time ROI analysis.  Further issues with classifications and authority to 
work on systems prevented us from personally implementing the SQL search on the host 
SPAWAR system.  A contractor at SPAWAR is currently in the process of implementing 
the search.  When completed and combined with the calculation and display portions of 
our prototype, the search will provide near-real-time ROI analysis.  
B. ANOTHER NEW DATA SOURCE  
During the course of our research, an additional data source was uncovered that 
consists of health and welfare status reports for the CCOP systems on individual ships.  
These status reports contain the total number of intercepts per system within a given time 
frame.  Additionally, these reports provide an even more accurate value than the database 
of records because when records are transferred to the database, some are lost due to 
network issues.  Analysis of the records in the database would therefore provide a lower 
ROI than is actually being created by the systems.   
Comparison of the ROIs calculated using the two data sources would provide a 
good indicator for how much output is lost due to network issues.  Although, the status 
report data is more accurate, it is not in a format that can be easily used for near-real-time 
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C. DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY FOR PROTOTYPE TESTING 
There were two sources of data that we wanted to collect and run through our 
prototype.  The first source was the health and welfare status reports of CCOP systems on 
individual vessels.  We selected eight different vessels that cover the four different 
versions of CCOP A that were all recently operating in the same oceanic region.  The 
data source contains status reports for the last 90 days of operation.  We selected a 30-day 
period of data for each of the eight vessels.  Each status report covers a single day worth 
of data, resulting in 240 status reports.   
For the next iteration of this research, we would need to be able to determine the 
total number of outputs for the 30-day period, we would need to manually examine the 
individual reports for each ship.  This would allow us to provide an ROI over the selected 
30-day period for the CCOP system on each of the eight different ships.  
 The second source of data is the database of individual records.  This data will 
eventually be accessible through a predefined SQL query that searches over a date range 
and returns the ship, system, and total number of outputs.  
Additional data are needed to make meaningful ROI calculations.  These include 
initial and recurring costs as well as estimated life cycles and complexity for each of the 
four versions of CCOP A.  The system experts at SPAWAR will provide the values for 
these calculations. 
Although we specified the data needed for a proof of concept, none of the 
specified data were available during the course of our thesis.  We used simulated data to 
test our prototype and ensure our calculations were correct.   
D. DATA ANALYSIS/ROI CALCULATIONS 
Our plan was to analyze the data by calculating an ROI for each set of data for 
each ship over a 30-day period.  ROI values were calculated using Excel with the 
following formula: 
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 For the status reports data set, the total monthly output is the sum of the daily total 
intercepts from 30 reports.  We intended to calculate this for each of the eight ships.  For 
the record database, the total monthly output is the value returned when the predefined 
SQL query is executed for a ship/system combination.  The complexity factor is a dollar 
value that captures the KVA of a given system.  For our purposes, we have based the 
complexity factor on the total number of days to learn the various functions performed by 
the system.  By days to learn we are literally referring to the number of days it would 
take a human to learn to do the same functions as well as the theory required to make the 
systems function as designed.  In this way, the complexity factor is a measure of the 
knowledge embedded within the system.  Aside from providing a logical means of 
weighing individual outputs, the complexity factor provides justifiable measurement for 
comparing the complexity and ROI values of different systems because the resulting 
estimates are auditable for accuracy.  The monthly cost is the sum of the initial purchase 
price divided by the life cycle in months and the average recurring monthly cost.  The 
result is a unitless ROI value that captures the KVA of the system. 
E. COTS SOFTWARE SOLUTION IMPLEMENTATION 
Our software prototype for ROI analysis of Navy CCOP systems focuses on the 
record database because the status reports are not currently in a format that can be easily 
accessed without significant user interaction.  Creation of an automated tool to collect the 
data in the various status reports into a single data source is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  
After the creation of a Vision Document, use cases, a System Software 
Requirements document and after additional meetings at SPAWAR, we determined that 
the only available means for extracting the data from the database was through a 
predefined SQL database search.  Our specification required that the search input be time 
frame (day/month/year) with an option for specifying specific ships and systems.  The 
search would return ship, system, and total number of outputs for the specified time 
frame.  Additionally, the search would be accessible through a web browser and the 
results would be exportable into Excel.  When our prototype is combined with the 
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Once the search was completed, we needed a way to make calculations and 
display our ROI results.  For the purposes of our prototype, we attempted to use two 
COTS products: Microsoft Excel and GaussSoft Radial Viewer.  Because the data from 
the search would already be exportable into Excel, it was relatively simple to add the 
additional data needed for calculations, perform the calculations, and display the results.  
In order to evaluate Radial Viewer, we provided our completed Excel spreadsheet to 
GaussSoft so they could mirror our calculations.  Based on some preliminary feedback, it 
appears that GaussSoft would be an effective solution.  Additionally, through a 
comparison of our prototype to GaussSoft, we determined that our prototype captured the 
functionality needed for near-real-time ROI analysis.  Because GaussSoft is not currently 
accredited for use in a classified environment, we decided to use our Excel spreadsheet as 
our initial prototype.  The prototype will be extremely useful in demonstrating our 
solution and determining those areas in which we should concentrate further work.  
Because of time and access constraints, we were unable to create production quality code 
resulting in a single software solution.  By creating a prototype that captures the high-
level functionality of our ideal system, we have a working solution for near-real-time 
calculation of ROI for Navy CCOP systems.         
F. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF SOFTWARE SOLUTION 
This portion of the thesis provides a how-to manual for using the prototype of the 
software solution for near-real-time ROI analysis.  The first step is Data Entry.  This first 




















Ver1 $1,000,000 120 $2,500 $1,000 $10,833.33 
CCOP A 
Ver2 $1,250,000 120 $2,500 $1,000 $12,916.67 
CCOP A 
Ver3 $1,500,000 120 $2,500 $1,000 $15,000.00 
CCOP A 
Ver4 $1,750,000 120 $2,500 $1,000 $17,083.33 
Figure 7.  Data Entry Tab of Solution Prototype 
The Data Entry tab contains fields for costs, life cycle, and complexity for 
individual systems.  The headings in red denote the required fields for each system.  
System is the name of the system and must be identical to the name that will be entered 
during ROI analysis.  Initial Cost is the initial, one-time purchase price of the system.  
Life Cycle is the total amount of time that the system is expected to be used before being 
retired.  Recurring Cost is the average monthly cost of keeping the system operational to 
include maintenance and updates.  Complexity is the dollar value assigned to an 
individual output based on the knowledge embedded in the system and based on KVA 
analysis of TTL.  The Monthly Cost, in yellow, is automatically calculated for later use in 
ROI calculations and should not be modified.  Once these values are entered for all 
systems that will be analyzed, the user can select the ROI Analysis tab of the spreadsheet.  
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Ship A CCOP A Ver1 65,000 30 6086.49 $1,000 $10,833 
Ship B CCOP A Ver1 80,000 30 7491.29 $1,000 $10,833 
Ship C CCOP A Ver2 103,000 30 8089.47 $1,000 $12,917 
Ship D CCOP A Ver2 116,000 30 9110.60 $1,000 $12,917 
Ship E CCOP A Ver3 132,000 30 8927.32 $1,000 $15,000 
Ship F CCOP A Ver3 163,000 30 11024.12 $1,000 $15,000 
Ship G CCOP A Ver4 178,000 30 10570.45 $1,000 $17,083 
Ship H CCOP A Ver4 213,000 30 12649.11 $1,000 $17,083 
     #N/A #N/A #N/A 
Example 3 CCOP A Ver4 100,000  #DIV/0! $1,000 $17,083 
Example 2 CCOP A Ver4  30 -1.01 $1,000 $17,083 
Example 1 CCOP B Ver4   #N/A #N/A #N/A 
        #N/A #N/A #N/A 
 
Figure 8.  ROI Analysis Tab of Solution Prototype 
The ROI Analysis tab contains fields for system(s), ship(s), total number of 
outputs, and length of the time frame.  The headings in red denote the required fields for 
each entry.  Ship is the name of the ship on which the system is installed.  System is the 
name of the system and is checked against the system names entered in the Data Entry 
tab.  If a system name does not match a name in the Data Entry tab, #N/A (Example 1) 
will be displayed in the ROI column.  Outputs is the total number of outputs created by 
the system over the given time frame.  If no value is entered for Outputs, a negative 
number (Example 2) will be displayed in the ROI column.  Time Frame is the length of 
the time frame (in days) over which outputs are counted.   If no value is entered for Time 
Frame, #DIV/0! (Example 3) will be displayed in the ROI column.  ROI (in blue) is the 
calculated ROI value for an individual system and should not be modified by the user.  
Complexity and Monthly Cost are pulled from the Data Entry tab for calculation purposes 
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The other eight data values are examples of what properly entered data would 
look like in order to produce the calculated ROI values.  The current format of this tab is 
subject to change upon completion of the predefined SQL search to allow for cut-and-
paste once the data is exported into Excel.  This will remove the need for manual entry of 
individual data fields.  
Once the user has completed all of the fields on the ROI Analysis tab, he or she 
can select the Graphical Display 1 tab for a visual representation of the calculated ROI 
values.  Figure 9 is an example of the Graphical Display 1 tab displaying the eight 
example data sets previously discussed.   
 
Figure 9.  Graphical Display 1 Tab of Solution Prototype 
The display format shown in Figure 9 presents the calculated ROI for each data 
set as an individual column that allows for easy comparison between individual ships and 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= - 56 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
Figure 10.  Graphical Display 2 Tab of Solution Prototype 
The display format shown in Figure 10 presents the average ROI over all ships 
carrying a given system, allowing for easy comparison of different systems.  From this 
hypothetical example, we can clearly conclude that subsequent versions of CCOP A have 
incrementally increasing ROIs.  Because of the limitations of Excel, the data ranges for 
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VI. CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SOFTWARE IMPLEMENTATION METHODOLOGY  
Our software development approach successfully avoided the common software 
implementation issues we identified.  By building upon previous interactions between 
developers, customers, and users, we further refined the needs of these groups during our 
Inception phase.  As part of the requirements analysis, we created a Vision Document and 
use cases that laid the foundation for our System Software Requirements (SSR).  The 
SSR itself detailed the requirements of the system and the manner in which it would 
operate through expanded use cases, system sequence diagrams, and system operation 
contracts.  We conducted a risk assessment and identified those issues that could prevent 
us from meeting our goals.  When it became apparent that a predefined database query 
would not be completed within our time frame, we modified our goals to focus on the 
calculation and display portions of a software solution.  Finally, we created a working 
prototype to provide ROI analysis of Navy CCOP systems.  The Unified Process proved 
to be a highly useful framework for software development. 
Software implementation is not an easy or trivial process, but this research 
demonstrated an effective plan to implement KVA software on classified networks.  We 
have presented the path to implementation, and Navy CCOP program managers should 
consider making KVA software implementation a long-term solution to provide ROI on 
Navy SIGINT collection systems.  Need-to-know access and restricted access to 
databases and networks are obstacles that this research project navigated around by 
reevaluating our goals as necessary.  Additionally, software certification and 
accreditation will be an issue for permanent implementation of KVA software.  Utilizing 
software developers and system experts already operating within the CCOP program 
could minimize these obstacles. 
Our analysis of five software implementation failures identified five major issues 
as well as a methodology for avoiding them.  This methodology can be applied to any 
software implementation project.  Although we recommended the Unified Process, any 
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to avoid the common pitfalls.  The most important factor we identified was the 
incremental development of an accurate and detailed requirements document.  
Developers, customers, and users must approve this document before software 
implementation begins.  The other major recommendation is the creation of a functional 
prototype.  Additional iterations should gradually build upon the prototype so that a 
functional and thoroughly tested system exists at each stage of development.     
B. BENEFITS OF ROI ANALYSIS 
Department of Defense funding has decreased due to the spending required by 
two wars and an economic recession.  Despite budget decreases, the demand for ISR is as 
high as it has ever been.  Implementing software with defendable and valid KVA 
assumptions provides the Navy CCOP program managers with ammunition to fight for 
acquisition and continued program funding where it is justified.  Implementing software 
that provides near-real-time ROI analysis is a step in the right direction to assist IT 
portfolio managers with difficult budgeting decisions. 
Additional benefits to having a near-real-time ROI analysis is that OPNAV and 
CCOP program managers will not be the only customers that would gain from this 
information.  Fleet commanders, strike group commanders, unit commanders, and CCOP 
system operators could be provided with remote ROI analysis to use as a measuring stick 
for CCOP system performance under their control.  It is recommended that CCOP 
program managers support implementation of KVA software to provide this near-real-
time ROI analysis.  Also, all CCOP systems should directly input performance data into 
the KVA software to provide an ROI comparison of all systems.  KVA assumptions 
established in previous studies should be revisited at implementation and again on a 
periodic basis.  Qualitative data such as location and mission tasking should also be 
incorporated into the KVA software solution. 
C. FOLLOW-ON RESEARCH 
Follow-on research should continue to document findings and store them at the 
appropriate classification levels in order to prevent gaps in knowledge from previous 
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based performance.  For instance, maybe the system only created 10 outputs and 
appeared to result in a low ROI, but perhaps 3 of the 10 times it created an output that led 
to the capture of a high-value target.  In this scenario, low system performance might be 
an acceptable risk in continuing funding because of the outcomes resulting from system 
operation. 
The next step in this research is to combine the software solution prototype with 
the completed predefined database query.  This will allow for near-real-time ROI analysis 
of CCOP systems.  At this point, the prototype should be demonstrated to customers and 
users for their evaluation and feedback.  This would complete the Elaboration phase of 
the Unified Process started during this study.  Based on customer and user feedback, the 
Construction phase would then be started, which would focus on combining the 
predefined query and production-quality calculation/display code into a single software 
solution.  Certification and Accreditation of the GaussSoft program should also be started 
so that if can be evaluated using the same classified data sets. 
A comparison of the status report data versus the predefined query data should 
also be conducted.  Specifically, searches should be executed for the same time frames 
and ships that we identified in the status reports data set.  This would allow for a 
comparison of ROI values from the two data sets and provide estimation of how much 
data is lost due to network errors.  A significant difference between ROI values might 
mean that the status reports should replace the predefined query as a source of data for 
ROI calculations. 
D. GENERALIZABILITY OF KVA METHOD AND ROI ANALYSIS 
The KVA method and ROI analysis are not limited to providing performance data 
for Navy CCOP systems.  These methodologies should be expanded across the fleet and 
the entirety of the DoD to provide ROIs for all military systems.  The ability to compare 
system performance is invaluable for making informed budgetary decisions.  This will be 
especially important in coming years when the military will most likely be downsized 
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APPENDIX A.  VISION DOCUMENT 
A. VISION DOCUMENT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis envisions a software solution for the calculation of near-real-time ROI 
values for Navy CCOP systems using KVA analysis.      
2. POSITIONING  
The capability to provide CCOP system managers with a real-time analysis of 
system performance does not currently exist.  Providing an ROI for these systems will 
provide a means of objectively comparing systems to support future funding allocation 
decisions.      
3. STAKEHOLDER DESCRIPTIONS  
The non-user stakeholders of the system are CCOP system managers, operators, 
and ship captains. 
The users of the system are military and contractor personnel.  These users have 
varying levels of computer and network knowledge.  The system will need to be user-
friendly to accommodate various levels of expertise.  
4. PRODUCT OVERVIEW  
The system will have three primary functions.  The first will be to gather user-
requested data from a database of records.  The user will be able to specify a time period, 
system(s), and ship(s).  The second function will be calculation of ROI values using 
database values and previously entered cost, life cycle, and complexity values for 
selected system(s).  The system will store user-entered values for cost, life cycle, and 
complexity for individual systems.  The final function will be a graphical display of the 
calculated ROI values in a default format.  Additional display formats will also be 
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5. SUMMARY OF SYSTEM FEATURES  
 Automated Data Collection: 
 User Specified Time Period (Day/Month/Year Range) 
 User Specified System(s) 
 User Specified Ship(s) 
 Storage of Cost, Life Cycle, and Complexity Data for Individual Systems 
 ROI Calculations 
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APPENDIX B.  SYSTEM SOFTWARE REQUIREMENTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. PURPOSE 
This requirements document outlines the software requirements for the system.  
These requirements have been derived from the system use cases.  The intended readers 
of this document are the software and systems engineers of the system and the 
stakeholders.  
2. SCOPE 
The System Software Requirements (SSR) applies to the initial vision of the 
system.  This vision can be found in the Vision Document.  The scope includes all 
requirements that may be implemented in the initial and follow-on versions of the system.  
The subset of requirements to be applied to the initial implementation is based on the use 
cases and the system operation contracts.  Once approved, this SSR will define the 
baseline system requirements. 
3. OBJECTIVES AND SUCCESS CRITERIA  
The system will be designed to achieve the following objectives:   
 Allow user selection of time frame, system(s), and ship(s) for ROI 
analysis. 
 Automatically collect necessary data from the database based on user 
selections. 
 Allow user entry of cost, life cycle, and complexity data for individual 
systems. 
 Store user-entered cost, life cycle, and complexity data for use in ROI 
calculations as required. 
 Accurately calculate ROI values for a given user selection. 
 Graphically display ROI values in an easy-to-understand format. 
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4. DEFINITIONS, ACRONYMS, AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Please see the list of acronyms and abbreviations at the beginning of this thesis.  
5. REFERENCES   
The system requirements are drawn from the following sources: 
    a.  Spivey Torres; Vision Document 
b.  Spivey, Torres; Use Cases  
c.  Spivey, Torres; Use Case Diagram  
d.  Spivey, Torres; System Sequence Diagrams  
e.  Spivey, Torres; Domain Model  
f.  Spivey, Torres; System Operation Contracts  
B. PROPOSED SYSTEM  
1. OVERVIEW   
The system provides near-real-time ROI analysis of Navy CCOP systems.  Users 
can tailor ROI analysis based on time frame, system(s), and ship(s). 
2. REQUIREMENTS   
Table 2 lists the requirements of the system.  The requirements have been 
categorized according to the FURPS+ model: Functional, Usability, Reliability, 
Performance, Supportability, and + for ancillary and sub-factors.  In table 2 - 
Requirements of the System, the first column is an identification number for the 
requirement, the second column lists the requirement itself, and the third column is a list 
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001 Provide GUI that allows point-and-click 
selections 
C01-C13 
002 Provide the capability to make selections using 
pull-down menus 
C03, C04, C05, C11, 
and C12  
003 Provide the ability for the user to select a time 
frame range at the day/month/year level of 
granularity 
C02 
004 Provide the ability for the user to select one or 
more systems for ROI analysis 
C02 
005 Provide the ability for the user to select one or 
more ships for ROI analysis 
C02 
006 Check user entries for completeness and 
correctness  
C03 
007 Highlight incomplete or incorrect user entries C03 
008 Notify the user when data entry has not been 
completed for a selected system(s) 
C04 
009 Perform a database search based on user-entered 
parameters 
C05 
010 Notify the user when the database does not 
contain data needed for ROI calculations 
C06 
011 Perform ROI calculations C07 
012 Provide the capability to graphically display ROI 
values 
C08 











graphical display format 
014 Provide the capability for the user to print the 
graphical display 
C10 
015 Provide the capability to return to the main menu 
when complete 
C11 and C15 
016 Provide the capability for the user to enter initial 
cost, recurring cost, life cycle, and complexity 
for individual systems  
C12 
017 Display and store user-entered data on individual 
systems (costs, life cycle, complexity) 
C13 
018 Notify the user when costs, life cycle, and/or 
complexity data is entered incorrectly 
C14 
019 Provide the capability for the user to enter data 




020 Display text with a default size no smaller than 
12 pt. 
__ 
021 Make display colors modifiable by the operator __ 
022 Provide a help dialog that meetisindustry 
standards for help functionality 
__ 
023 Provide access to electronic documentation __ 
Reliability 
024 Upon complete failure, the system should 
recover to the last-known good state 
__ 
Performance 











configurations to allow for user needs 
026 Provide response to user actions within 1 second __ 
Supportability 
027 Have patch capability to allow for future 
modifications for the software to adapt to new 
operating systems or operating system upgrades 
__ 
028 Be easily migrated to a new operating system 
after an operating system upgrade 
__ 
029 Maximize use of common object-oriented 
language 
__ 
3. CONSTRAINTS   
 Hardware components of the system will consist of pre-existing desktop or 
laptop computers running the DoD standard version of Microsoft 
Windows.  
 Software components of the system will utilize object-oriented 
technology.  Therefore, the system will be compatible with and adaptable 
to an object-oriented environment.  
 The system will be developed using the Unified Process.  
C. SYSTEM MODELS   
1. USE CASE DIAGRAM   
Figure 11 shows the use case diagram for the system.  Two use cases have been 
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Figure 11.  Use Case Diagram 
2. EXPANDED USE CASE SCENARIOS 
Both of the use cases have been expanded to UC-1: ROI Analysis and UC-2: Data 
Entry.  Below are the expanded use case scenarios. 
   
UC-1: ROI Analysis 
Scope: System 
Level: User goal 
Primary Actor: User 
Stakeholders and Interests:  
 User: Wants an application that is easy to use and quickly calculates and 
displays ROI values. 
 CCOP Program Managers: Need accurate ROI values displayed in an 
easy-to-understand graphical format.  Additional display formats should 
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Preconditions:  
Cost, life cycle, and complexity data have been entered for selected 
system(s).  The database contains data on system(s) and ship(s) for the time frame 
selected. 
Success Guarantee (or Postconditions):  
ROI values are graphically displayed in an easy-to-understand format.  
Additional display options are provided. 
Main Success Scenario (or Basic Flow):  
1. User initializes the system. 
2. System displays the menu with options. 
3. User selects ROI analysis option. 
4. System displays a dialog box with options for time frame, system(s) 
and ship(s). 
5. User enters time frame, system(s) and ship(s). 
6. User selects OK. 
7. System calculates ROI values based on the selected values. 
8. System displays ROI values in a graphical format. 
9. User selects a different display option. 
10. System displays ROI values in the selected format. 
11. User selects print. 
12. System displays print dialog box. 
13. User selects exit. 
14. System displays the main menu. 
Extensions (or Alternative Flows): 
7a. User enters insufficient data or data in wrong format. 
1. System prompts user to check appropriate data fields. 
2. User corrects fields and selects OK. 
7b.  System does not contain cost and life cycle data for selected 
system(s). 
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2. User corrects fields and selects OK. 
7c.  Database does not contain data on selected system(s) and ship(s) 
during the time frame. 
1. System informs user that data is not available for selected time 
frame. 
2. System prompts user to check appropriate data fields. 
3. User corrects fields and selects OK. 
 
UC-2: Data Entry 
Scope: System 
Level: User goal 
Primary Actor: User   
Stakeholders and Interests:  
User: Wants to enter cost, life cycle, and complexity data for an individual 
system to be used in future ROI calculations. 
Preconditions:   
User has cost, life cycle, and complexity data for individual system(s). 
Success Guarantee (or Postconditions):   
System stores cost, life cycle, and complexity data for use in future ROI 
calculations.  
Main Success Scenario (or Basic Flow): 
1. User initializes the system. 
2. System displays the menu with options. 
3. User selects data entry. 
4. System displays a dialog box with options for system, initial cost, 
recurring cost, life cycle, and complexity. 
5. User enters system, initial cost, recurring cost, life cycle, and 
complexity. 
6. User selects OK. 
7. System displays entered data and requests if user would like to enter 
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8. User selects no. 
9. System displays the main menu. 
Extensions (or Alternate Flows): 
7a. User enters insufficient data or data in the wrong format. 
1. System prompts user to check appropriate data fields. 
2. User corrects data and selects OK. 
8a. User selects yes to enter data for another system. 
1. System displays a dialog box with options for system, initial cost,     
     recurring cost, life cycle, and complexity. 
2. User enters data and selects OK. 
3. SYSTEM SEQUENCE DIAGRAMS  
Figures 12 and 13 are the system sequence diagrams for the expanded use cases 
UC-1–ROI Analysis and UC-2–Data Entry, respectively.  The purpose of these diagrams 
is to illustrate the use cases in a visual format.  They show in detail how the system is 
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Figure 13.  System Sequence Diagram for UC-2 
4. DOMAIN MODEL   
Figure 14 shows the domain model for the system.  It is a conceptual model that 
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Figure 14.  Domain Model for the System 
5. SYSTEM OPERATION CONTRACTS   
Below are the system operation contracts for the system.  These identify the 
system state changes that occur when an operation executes.  
Contract C01:  initializeSystem 
Operation:       initializeSystem() 
Cross Reference:    Use Cases:  ROI Analysis, Data Entry 
Preconditions:      - Start screen displayed 
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Contract C02:  selectROI 
Operation:       selectROI() 
Cross Reference:   Use Cases:  ROI Analysis 
Preconditions:       - Main menu options displayed 
Postconditions:     - Dialog box displayed with time frame, system(s) and 
ship(s) fields 
Contract C03:  userError 
Operation:        userError() 
Cross Reference:   Use Cases:  ROI Analysis 
Preconditions:      - User has entered insufficient/incorrect information and 
selected OK 
Postconditions:    - Dialog box displayed with time frame, system(s) and 
ship(s) fields 
- Insufficient/incorrect fields are highlighted 
Contract C04:  calcDataError 
Operation:        calcDataError() 
Cross Reference:   Use Cases:  ROI Analysis 
Preconditions:      - User has entered correct information and selected ok 
- System does not contain cost, life cycle, and complexity 
data for selected system(s) 
Postconditions:    - Dialog box displayed with time frame, system(s) and 
ship(s) fields 
- Statement is displayed informing user that cost and life  
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Contract C05:  requestData 
Operation:        requestData() 
Cross Reference:   Use Cases:  ROI Analysis 
Preconditions:       - User has entered correct information and selected OK 
- System contains cost, life cycle, and complexity data for 
selected system(s)  
Postconditions:     - User specified data is returned from database 
Contract C06:  databaseError 
Operation:        databaseError() 
Cross Reference:   Use Cases:  ROI Analysis 
Preconditions:       - User specified data is retuned from database 
- Data does not contain information on user selected 
system(s) 
Postconditions:     - Dialog box displayed with time frame, system(s) and 
ship(s) fields 
- Statement is displayed informing user that database does 
not contain information on selected system(s)/ship(s) for 
given time frame.  
Contract C07:  calculateROI 
Operation:        calculateROI() 
Cross Reference:   Use Cases:  ROI Analysis 
Preconditions:       - System has received necessary data from database 
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Contract C08:  displayROI 
Operation:        displayROI() 
Cross Reference:   Use Cases:  ROI Analysis 
Preconditions:      - ROI values calculated and stored 
Postconditions:    - ROI values are graphically displayed in default format 
- Options displayed for other view formats 
Contract C09:  changeDisplay 
Operation:        changeDisplay() 
Cross Reference:   Use Cases:  ROI Analysis 
Preconditions:      - User selects new display format 
Postconditions:    - ROI values are graphically displayed in selected format 
Contract C10:  printDisplay 
Operation:        printDisplay() 
Cross Reference:   Use Cases:  ROI Analysis 
Preconditions:      - ROI values are graphically displayed in selected format 
- User selects print option 
Postconditions:    - Print dialog box is displayed 
Contract C11:  displayComplete 
Operation:        displayComplete() 
Cross Reference:   Use Cases:  ROI Analysis 
Preconditions:      - ROI values are graphically displayed in selected format 
- User selects exit 
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Contract C12:  selectData 
Operation:        selectData() 
Cross Reference:   Use Cases:  Data Entry 
Preconditions:      - Main menu options displayed 
Postconditions:    - Dialog box displayed with initial cost, recurring cost, and 
life cycle fields.  
Contract C13:  dataEntry 
Operation:        dataEntry() 
Cross Reference:   Use Cases:  Data Entry 
Preconditions:      - User has entered data and selected OK 
Postconditions:    - Entered data is displayed and saved for future 
calculations. 
- User is queried to enter additional data 
Contract C14:  dataError 
Operation:        dataError() 
Cross Reference:   Use Cases:  Data Entry 
Preconditions:      - User has entered insufficient/incorrect data and selected 
OK 
Postconditions:    - Dialog box displayed with initial cost, recurring cost, and 
life cycle fields 
- Insufficient/incorrect fields are highlighted 
Contract C15:  dataComplete 
Operation:        dataComplete() 
Cross Reference:   Use Cases:  Data Entry 
Preconditions:      - User is queried to enter additional data and selects no 
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APPENDIX C.  SOFTWARE DESIGN SPECIFICATION 
A. INTRODUCTION  
1. PURPOSE  
  The purpose of this software design specification is to document the first iteration 
of the system.  Our intent is to produce a working prototype based on our operation 
contracts and to test it against the system requirements document.  The intended readers 
of this document are the software engineers of the system and the stakeholders.  
2. OBJECTIVES AND SUCCESS CRITERIA  
The system will be designed to achieve the following objectives:   
 Allow user selection of time frame, system(s), and ship(s) for ROI 
analysis. 
 Automatically collect necessary data from the database based on user 
selections. 
 Allow user entry of cost, life cycle, and complexity data for individual 
systems. 
 Store user-entered cost, life cycle, and complexity data for use in ROI 
calculations as required. 
 Accurately calculate ROI values for a given user selection. 
 Graphically display ROI values in an easy-to-understand format. 
 Provide additional displays formats and the ability to print the graphic 
display. 
3. REFERENCES   
The system requirements are drawn from the following sources: 
a.  Spivey Torres; Vision Document 
b.  Spivey, Torres; Use Cases  
c.  Spivey, Torres; Use Case Diagram  
d.  Spivey, Torres; System Sequence Diagrams  
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f.  Spivey, Torres; System Operation Contracts  
g. Spivey, Torres; Software Requirements, p. 62 
B. ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN  
1. SCOPE  
The Software Design Specification (SDS) applies to the System Software 
Requirements (SSR).  This can be found in reference g, Software Requirements.   
The scope includes all requirements that may be implemented in the initial and 
follow-on versions of the system.  The subset of requirements to be applied to the initial 
implementation is based on references b, Use Cases, and f, Operations Contracts. 
2. DESIGN GOALS   
We envision a single software solution for near-real-time ROI analysis of Navy 
CCOP system using the KVA methodology.  
The design goals include the desirable attributes of Version 1 of the system.  
These attributes are derived from the non-functional requirements.  The requirement 
priority order is: Functional, Usability, Performance, Reliability, and Supportability.  
Version 1 of the system is a fully functional graphic user interface (GUI) that provides 
implementation of operation contracts 1-15 in support of Use Cases 1 and 2.  GUI 
priority order is as follows: main menu interface, data entry interface, ROI analysis 
interface, ROI display interface, and print interface.   
3. LOGICAL ARCHITECTURE   
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Figure 15.  Logical Architecture of the System 
4. RATIONALES   
Our logical architecture attempts to simplify our project in a cohesive way.  We 
decided against an application layer because we will only have one user interface.  Our 
implementation uses an open architecture or relaxed layer architecture, which allows a 
layer to use features from many lower layers.  This hopefully results in a more efficient 
and compact code that will allow modification ease.   We have decided our logical 
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we will include three layers.  The UI layer is modeled as a package named UI, the 
Domain layer as Domain, and the Services layer as Services.  Our domain layer attempts 
to encompass all requirements specified in our use cases, system sequence diagrams 
(SSDs), and domain model.  The Interface and Services layers are independent enough 
for possible code reuse.    
C. OBJECT DESIGN   
1. SCOPE   
The scope includes all requirements that may be implemented in the initial and 
follow-on versions of the system.  The subset of requirements to be applied to the initial 
implementation is based on references b, Use Cases, and f, Operations Contracts.  
2. INTERACTION DIAGRAMS 
Because all 15 of our operation contracts are relatively simple, none of them was 
chosen for further design. 
3. DESIGN CLASS DIAGRAM 
Figure 16 shows a Design Class Diagram for the system.  It incorporates fleshed 
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D. DATA DICTIONARY  
Table 3.   Data Dictionary 
Term Definition and Information Format Default 
ship Ship name string   
system System name string   
timeFrame Data time group date   
outputs Number of outputs integer   
values Information needed for ROI calc list   
ships_systems Ships/systems not in database list   
data Data needed from database list   
systems Systems without data entry complete list   
type Kind of error statement integer   
roi Calculated ROI value integer   
format Display format integer   
initialCost Initial system cost (dollars) integer   
recurringCost Monthly cost of system (dollars) integer   
lifecycle Expected system lifespan (months) integer   
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